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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

23 August 1951

*SET 2*  
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN TERMINATING  
THE KAESONG NEGOTIATIONS

THE PROBLEM

To examine possible Communist intentions on the assumption that they have terminated the cease-fire negotiations in Kaesong.

ESTIMATE

1. SE-8, "Possible Communist Objectives in Proposing a Cease Fire in Korea", published 6 July 1951, recognized the possibility that the Kaesong cease fire negotiations may from the outset have been intended to gain time for the preparation of a new and perhaps larger scale Communist offensive in Korea. SE-9, "Probable Immediate Developments in the Far East Following a Failure in the Cease Fire Negotiations in Korea", published 6 August 1951, examined the

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probable military consequences of a breakdown of the Kaesong talks and concluded that the Communists would have to choose between two possible major courses of action: (a) to accept the continuation of a conflict of substantially the scale and nature that preceded the cease-fire negotiations; or (b) to take more drastic measures to destroy or expel UN forces. Recent intelligence reinforces these conclusions.

During recent weeks the Communist forces in the Korean area have improved their over-all capabilities.

2. Since the Communists must realize that a termination of the cease-fire negotiations in Korea might lead to expansion of the war by the US, with a consequent increased danger of general war between the US and the USSR, we believe it unlikely that termination of the Kaesong talks indicates that the Communists have abandoned all attempts to reach a negotiated solution of the Korean conflict. We therefore conclude that even though the Kaesong talks have been broken off, there is a real likelihood that the Communists will attempt to reopen the cease fire negotiations in the near future, probably on a political rather than a military level.

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3. The forthcoming visit to Gromyko to New York and Washington may have been planned to coincide with the obviously fabricated charges of UN/US bad faith at Kaesong. Gromyko may attempt through a public statement, or through conversations at the UN, or through private negotiations with State Department officials, to discuss the Korean situation in a larger setting. Rupture of the cease fire talks at Kaesong would perhaps give greater leverage to his efforts. At the same time, the breakdown of the Kaesong talks, on the eve of the San Francisco Conference, may create fear, confusion and disunity among the countries participating in the Japanese Peace Treaty discussions.

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